Trust, Belief and Honesty

14 pages•Published: December 18, 2015

Abstract

We study two modal logics of trust that interconnect the trust modality with the individual belief modalities of agents. One logic includes an axiom stating that if agent i trusts agent j with respect to a statement p then i believes that j does not disbelieve p. In the second logic, if i trusts j concerning p then i believes that j believes p. These extensions of the logic of trust help to solve some unintuitive consequences that arise when the semantics of trust and belief are independent. As a main technical result we prove the soundness and completeness of these logics.

Keyphrases: doxastic logic, modal logic, trust

In: Georg Gottlob, Geoff Sutcliffe and Andrei Voronkov (editors). GCAI 2015. Global Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol 36, pages 215-228.

Links:	https://easychair.org/publications/paper/Rp
	https://doi.org/10.29007/qrp5

BibTeX entry

@inproceedings{GCAI2015:Trust_Belief_Honesty,
  author    = {David Pearce and Levan Uridia},
  title     = {Trust, Belief and Honesty},
  booktitle = {GCAI 2015. Global Conference on Artificial Intelligence},
  editor    = {Georg Gottlob and Geoff Sutcliffe and Andrei Voronkov},
  series    = {EPiC Series in Computing},
  volume    = {36},
  publisher = {EasyChair},
  bibsource = {EasyChair, https://easychair.org},
  issn      = {2398-7340},
  url       = {/publications/paper/Rp},
  doi       = {10.29007/qrp5},
  pages     = {215-228},
  year      = {2015}}

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